City to help NBC Universal relocate unit to Manhattan
New York City Industrial Development Agency (IDA) has approved an amendment to an existing agreement with NBC Universal that will lengthen and deepen its corporate commitment to New York City and will attract to the city its MSNBC unit, including 421 jobs currently in New Jersey.
IDA approved about $1.5 million in real estate tax benefits to facilitate the relocation. As a result of the agreement, NBC Universal will make significant capital and technological investments in its midtown Manhattan facilities.
“NBC Universal’s expanded commitment to New York City reaffirms the City’s role as a global media center in an expanding digital environment,” said Robert C. Lieber, president of New York City Economic Development Corporation, which administers IDA.
“We are pleased to assist NBC Universal with a relocation that will complement the flagship news operations of NBC News while bringing new capital investment and jobs to New York City.”
The deal with NBC Universal amends an existing agreement reached in 1987, which committed NBC Universal to an employment base figure through 2010.
Under the new agreement, NBC Universal has committed to invest at least $57 million in its broadcasting, news gathering and production facility at 30 Rockefeller Center in order to accommodate its MSNBC unit, which will relocate 421 jobs from Secaucus, NJ.
Additionally, NBC Universal will be required to maintain at least 3,850 total jobs, an increase from the currently required 2,250 total jobs NBC Universal is require to maintain today. NBC Universal will also extend by 13 years its overall city-wide job commitment to the City to 2023 from 2010.
In addition, IDA Board approved financing assistance for the expansion of two not-for-profit organizations in Brooklyn and Manhattan and an industrial company in Queens.
The three expansions and the agreement with NBC Universal will help spur more than $73 million in private investment, while retaining and creating more than 4,000 jobs.
Greenpoint Manufacturing and Design Center, a not-for-profit developer of industrial facilities, will receive real estate tax benefits of about $4.5 million to acquire and renovate a 72,000 s/f facility in Brooklyn.
IDA financing assistance will allow the company to develop long-term affordable space for small- and medium-sized industrial businesses.
In addition to IDA financing assistance, the company will also receive $3.5 million in capital project funds from the New York City Council through the Industrial Acquisition Write-down Fund, as well as $500,000 from the Brooklyn Borough President’s Office for the project.
IDA approved approximately $5 million in tax-exempt bond financing and about $140,000 in mortgage recording tax benefits for Manhattan Community Access Corporation’s new Harlem location.
The not-for-profit public access cablecast and media training provider will use IDA financing assistance to acquire, renovate and equip an 8,000 s/f building to house a public access TV production and broadcast facility and a new media skills training and access center.
IDA approved approximately $9 million in tax-exempt bond financing, about $2.7 million in real estate tax benefits and about $194,000 in sales tax exemptions to help Cool Wind Ventilation Corporation acquire and renovate a 35,500 s/ f facility in Glendale, Queens and to purchase production equipment.
19K one station unit training: the first step in forging the thunderbolt
The foundation for every enlisted tank crewman is 19K one station unit training (OSUT). This 15-week course is taught by 2d Battalion, 81st Armor Regiment, 1st Armor Training Brigade, Fort Knox, Kentucky. This is the only battalion in the U.S. Army that trains tankers and it is the one unit that all 19K enlisted tankers must pass through as they start their careers on the finest tank in the world. 19K OSUT combines 9 weeks of basic combat training (BCT) and 6 weeks of advanced individual training (AIT).
A typical class is 165 students; most are active duty with a smaller percentage from the Army National Guard and the military occupational specialty transfer (MOS-T) program. With current assignment procedures, there exists a 100-percent chance of Active Duty and MOS-T graduates being assigned to deploying units. It is not uncommon for drill sergeants to receive letters from recent graduates who are in combat zones less than 3 months after departure. The seriousness and importance of this is not lost on the drill sergeants and tank commanders who train these new tankers.
Although the focus of this article is not on the BCT portion of training, it is important to note the continuity between the two phases. The tasks trained and tested in BCT are not left behind in lieu of learning the tank crewman tasks in AIT. On the contrary, many tasks from the BCT phase are reinforced throughout the “gold phase,” as the AIT portion is called. Discipline, physical conditioning, first aid skills, weapons skills, and loader and driver skills are trained and reinforced continually throughout the 15 weeks. Additionally, every drill sergeant and tank instructor is a 19K and remains with new tankers from the first training day until graduation. The majority of drill sergeants and tank instructors have Operation Iraqi Freedom/Operation Enduring Freedom experience, which ensures tankers not only receive technical training, but also current tactics, techniques, procedures, and the realities of battle.
The main focus of the 6-week gold phase is proficiency in those skills associated with loaders and drivers of the M11-series tank. Tankers become familiar with gunner and tank commander duties; and excellence in armor (EIA) candidates and MOS-T tankers receive additional training. All technical training is taken directly from the M l-series technical manuals with the majority of training conducted onboard M1AI or M1A2SEP tanks in the motor pool or in a field environment, as well as a small amount of time in simulators. Tankers must pass three gate tests during the gold phase: the armor crewman test (ACT), which tests individual tank technical skills to tank crew gunnery skills test (TCGST) standards: the armor stakes, which tests additional TCGST skills and reinforces individual BCT skills in a collective environment; and finally, the gold field training exercise (FTX), which tests skills from throughout the 15 weeks in a collective environment. EIA candidates and MOST tankers must also complete unit conduct of fire training, tank boresighting, engagement procedures, and gunnery training.
The gold phase FTX is an 8-day capstone field exercise that challenges 19Ks to demonstrate proficiency of individual skills with hands-on application. Tankers will perform proficiency tests under a variety of day and night conditions, which include a modified gunnery table, dismounted patrols in an urban environment, occupying a forward operating base (FOB), tank section movement, a 15-kilometer combat foot patrol, and tank recovery. Tankers begin their final exercise rotating between a modified gunnery table and the basic driving course/advanced driving course (BDC/ ADC). BDC/ADC training builds on motor pool and tank driver simulator (TDS) training. The ADC has 90 connexes lining the course to replicate close urban terrain. Every tanker receives 21 miles of actual driving during the gold FTX.
During conduct of the modified gunnery table, each tanker trains on individual loading and driving skills while becoming familiar with live-fire crew duties. Each will experience as many as 18 main gun firing events while rotating between loader, driver, and gunner positions. They will also engage targets with the loader’s M240 machine gun, M9 pistol, and M4 carbine. The loader’s M240 is fired day and night. Again, EIA candidates and MOS-T tankers will spend more time in the gunner’s seat and may fire as many as 30 main gun rounds.
Once the 3 days of BDC/ADC and gunnery are completed, tankers then transition into 4 days of lane training, which includes field driving, field maintenance, FOB, and urban training. The field driving lane tests individual loading and driving skills while a tank section moves cross country and reacts to opposing force (OPFOR)-induced scenarios, such as improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and small arms fire. The maintenance lane provides instruction to the tankers on typical field maintenance. Tankers will break both tracks and walk them completely off a tank, then reattach them alter training on short tracking. They will also prepare a tank for towing and inspect V packs. Additionally, if a tank breaks down, the tankers participate in the repairs. There is no better training than replacing a torsion bar or fixing an inside thrown track in cold mud to gain an appreciation for doing things right.
Tankers will conduct a FOB lane where they exercise individual skills while conducting entrance control points (ECPs), performing as a quick-reaction force, and conducting patrols while reacting to contact such as IEDs, indirect fire attacks, snipers, and the local population. The urban lane enables tankers to exercise individual skills by clearing rooms, performing dismounted patrols, administering first aid, and reporting, among other tasks. Focus is not only provided on proficiency of individual skills, but also on making sound judgments and decisions based on the rules of engagement and the Army values.
On completion of lane training, tankers conduct a nighttime 15-kilometer combat patrol where they demonstrate their ability to react to five situational-based scenarios, including an IED attack, a near ambush, the media, and an angry populace. All tankers wear full body armor with small-arms protective insert (SAPI) plates, as they do during the entire FTX, along with radios, weapons, and the typical gear they will see in combat.
The field portion ends with a 15-kilometer patrol, but the testing and training does not. Tankers are given 5 days to recover their tanks and all equipment used in the FTX, which culminates with the battalion commander and command sergeant major’s inspection of all tanks, weapons, and TA-50. Tankers learn about wash rack operations and are trained by tank instructors and drill sergeants in after-operations maintenance.
19K OSUT also awards the K4 and R4 additional skill identifiers. During week 7, tankers destined for M1A2 SEP units will be separated for assignment-oriented training to allow focus on SEP-specific tasks. Following graduation, tankers destined for Stryker-equipped units conduct 14 additional days of training, which is focused on maintenance, driving, and basic Force XXI battle command brigade and below (FBCB2) operation. Similar training will begin within the next year for the Stryker mobile gun system.
Every month surveys are reviewed from recent graduates, first-line supervisors, and the installation’s combat leaders. Based on the feedback from these surveys, training is continuously altered to support the force’s needs. Through MountedManeuverNet, feedback and comments regarding training can be directly sent to 2d Battalion, 81st Armor Regiment. As the modern battlefield evolves so will 19K OSUT, but one thing will not change–we will continue to produce well-trained, innovative tankers who will crew the world’s most lethal tank across a full-spectrum of operations.
Captain Michael A. Porcelli is the company commander, A Company, 2d Battalion, 81st Armor Regiment, Fort Knox, KY. He received a B.A. from the University of Mississippi. His military education includes Armor Officer Basic Course, Armor Captains Career Course, and Combined Arms and Services Staff School. He has served in various command and staff position, to include S3 (Plans), 3d Brigade Combat Team, 1st Armored Division, Fort Riley, KS; J3 (Operations), Joint Task Force Bravo, Honduras; mortar platoon leader, 1st Squadron, 12th (1-12) Cavalry, Fort Hood, TX; and tank platoon leader, 1-12 Cavalry, Fort Hood.
Unit, Local Officials Team Up to Improve Roadways in Iraq
Al Batha, Iraq, has 15 kilometers of newly paved streets thanks, in part, to members of an Army Guard brigade combat team.
Soldiers of the 1st Brigade Combat Team, 34th Infantry Division’s civil-military operations (CMO) team supervised U.S.-funded projects to grade the southern Iraqi city’s streets, which had not been maintained in 20 years.
“Many of the streets had eight-footwide pot holes filled with mud, sewage and garbage, making the street impassable for municipal vehicles, daily routines and commercial transit,” said Capt. Colin Fleming, the brigade’s deputy CMO officer.
The efforts restored many of Al Batha’s most decrepit streets to serviceable gravel thoroughfares. Inspired by the progress, city officials then worked with provincial authorities to pave the streets.
The Al Batha street projects are part of 30 miles of roads brigade projects have repaired in Dhi Qar province.
Brigade CMO teams have also completed several other road projects elsewhere in southern Iraq.
Among them was the construction of a new bridge over a canal last tail in the rural date-farming village of Bahkan in Babil province.
The old bridge, made of concrete only a foot thick, was the only access across canals surrounding the village, home to more than 100 families. It had degraded so much the underlying support beams were showing.
“I picked a contractor from that community and all the workers were hired from Bahkan so they took pride in the work,” said 1st Lt. Stephen Hall, a member of the 1st Battalion, 125th Field Artillery CMO team. “Now the main access to their village is open again.”
Unit civil-military operations officers said such projects have gained Coalition forces support by filling a local void.
They said transportation offices are few in Babil and Dhi Qar provinces. Consequently, many roads rendered impassable by heavy erosion go unrepaired, leaving local residents to find alternative passage to markets, clean drinking-water sources and schools.
Medical diplomacy in full-spectrum operations
AMERICAN MEDICINE is a powerful “weapon of freedom” in our Nation’s arsenal against terrorists and the forces of oppression.
(l) However, tailgate medicine, as commonly practiced by many well-meaning medical civil-assistance programs (MEDCAPs), is not an effective tool for commanders conducting counterinsurgency (COIN) operations in the Iraqi theater of operations. To legitimize the Iraqi Government, we must build capability in local institutions, not replace essential services like medicine with direct medical care by occupying forces.
The major fault of MEDCAPs in Iraq is strategic. MEDCAPs undermine local medical services sanctioned by the Iraqi Ministry of Health and provincial medical directors, thus decreasing support for Iraq’s national and provincial governments. The insurgency in Iraq will be defeated when Iraqis reject it through their acceptance of and dependence on the legitimate Iraqi Government. Instead of helping to achieve this end state, MEDCAPs, no matter how well intentioned, planned, or executed, weaken Iraqi Government services and, therefore, are counterproductive to U.S. strategic aims.Military medicine can be an effective operational tool if we apply it thoughtfully. Many have noted that it contributed to social, economic, and political stability in past conflicts.
(2) Tommy Thompson, the former U.S. secretary of Health and Human Services, has called for increased “medical diplomacy” in America’s foreign and defense policy, declaring it “the best chance to win the war on terror and defeat the terrorists.” (3) The 2005 National Strategy for Victory in Iraq cited the value of building and rehabilitating health care facilities.
(4) More recently, The Iraq Study Group Report stated that “building the capacity of the Iraqi Government should be at the heart of U.S. reconstruction efforts.”
(5) However, turning observations, strategic guidance, and situational understanding into effective operational missions presents a challenge for leaders on today’s battlefield. This article examines the U.S. military’s experiences with medical civil-military operations (MCMO); discusses current policy, doctrine, and practice; and describes the experiences of the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment in Tal Afar, Iraq, in 2005 as an example of successful brigade-level operations that support, build, and promote local medical institutions.
We have used medicine as a tool for winning hearts and minds in previous COIN campaigns. For example, an essential part of the pacification campaign in the Philippines Insurrection was establishing public health measures, along with organizing municipal governments and public schools. General E.S. Otis and General Arthur MacArthur’s pacification policies were the foundation for the colonial civilian government that President William Howard Taft later established. The medical component of the program helped achieve a relative peace that lasted for nearly four decades.
(6)During the Vietnam War, the U.S. military invested between $500 million and $750 million in the Medical Civic Action Program (MEDCAP) and treated more than 40 million Vietnamese civilians.
(7) MEDCAP was designed to provide aid to villages and communities by using Vietnamese military medical personnel assisted by U.S. medical personnel, but with the introduction of large numbers of U.S. troops into Vietnam in 1965, U.S. military medical teams assumed responsibility for medical care to civilians in their respective areas of operation (AOs).
Dehydration in Extreme Temperatures While Conducting Stability and Support Operations in a Combat Zone
This analysis reports the effects of extreme temperatures (temperatures exceeding 100°F) on the hydration of infantrymen conducting stability and support operations during phase IV Operation Iraqi Freedom in the months of June and July 2003 in An Nasiriyah, Iraq. Fifty-three infantrymen were evaluated for signs of dehydration after completing questionnaires regarding their activities during the previous 24 hours. We conducted an analysis comparing these activities and their state of hydration. The most significant factors contributing to dehydration in extreme environments proved to be the individual’s level of exertion and exposure to the sun while levels of water and caffeine consumed showed no correlation to one’s level of hydration. We conclude that integrating a proactive, field-expedient means to monitor a unit’s level of hydration can increase the combat effectiveness of units in training and combat alike.
An infantry company consisting of 158 Marines and Saflors in southern Iraq was conducting stabUity and support operations (SASO) during the summer months of 2003. Southern Iraq is a region exposed to extremely high daUy temperatures during the spring and summer months. During the months of June and July, the average temperatures in An Nasiriyah, Iraq, range from lows in the 90s to highs exceeding 1 1O°F as shown in Figure 1 . Temperatures during June and July of 2003 in An Nasiriyah were reported to exceed 12O°F and showed sirmlar averages from 90 to 110°F in June and 95 to 1 14°F in July.1
Dehydration can result in physical fatigue as well as cause significant decreases in performance of physical and mental skills.2-4 Dehydration of individual Sailors and Marines has a direct effect on the performance and military readiness of their unit in a combat environment. Extreme environments make hydration a critical factor in military planning and combat command. The basic guidance from our medical personnel directed Marines and Sailors to prevent dehydration by drinking as much water as possible and avoiding caffeine, summarized in Figure 2.
Extreme conditions push the body to its physiological Umlts.5 Combat operations in such environments further compound the difficulties of staying hydrated. To determine proper prophylactic measures to guard against dehydration in extreme temperatures, it is necessary to understand which mUitary tasks are most likely to result in the dehydration of infantrymen and how to mitigate their effects. Monitoring individual hydration can minimize dehydration,6 and monitoring hydration levels throughout a unit would improve its combat effectiveness.
Co. F 2/25 occupied three positions within the heart of An Nasiriyah, Iraq, among the local populace. The situation Umited the comfort living features, such as electricity and air conditioning, afforded to the company’s Marines and Sailors. Furthermore, SASO required 24-hour operations throughout our area of operation. At least one patrol through every portion of our area of operation was conducted each 8 hours, totaling -600 patrols over 85 days.
Our company’s presence in An Nasiriyah provided a unique opportunity to evaluate the effects of combat operations and SASO on dehydration of infantrymen as weU as the guidance we received regarding hydration. As far as we are aware, the majority of references on this topic detail studies on units in training scenarios or are case studies of combat experiences in hot environments; whereas, this is an analysis of data coUected on dehydration in a theater of continuing combat. We beUeve this makes our analysis new and useful to current and future units deploying to the Iraqi theater or other environments exposed to extreme temperatures. We conducted this analysis during the opportunities our mission requirements aUowed and beUeve that our findings are appUcable to combat arms and combat support units alike.
Methods
Co. F 2/25 simultaneously occupied three positions within An Nasiriyah during this period. One hundred of the 158 Marines and Sailors of the company were in the company headquarter position where the authors were. The other two company positions, each consisting of a platoon, were occupied by the other 58 Marines and Sailors. The data collected were solely from the company headquarter position, consisting of a rifle platoon, weapons platoon, and company headquarters personnel. Measurements from additional positions exceeded mission constraints.
Members of the company were exposed to the local climate for 3 months before the time measurements were taken in June and July 2003; therefore, we assumed all members of the company were accUmated to the extreme temperatures. The company position was a multistoried, war-torn, government buüding. Sleeping, eating, and working areas within the position were exposed to the ambient atmosphere. The single air conditioner used within the position was used to cool water and food, for which ice had previously been used. None of the vehicles used by the company were air-conditioned.
The command originally used routine measuring of vital signs as a means of monitoring hydration before any collection of ‘data. Upon realizing the surprising number of “walking dehydration” cases, the authors proposed that further information be gathered from members of the company headquarters position to determine causative factors of dehydration. Realizing that information was to be gathered, analyzed, and potentially reported, data were recorded only from those that provided informed consent after being briefed on the goals, benefits, and risks of such an analysis.
Members of the company responded to questions regarding their activity in the previous 24-hour period .The company’s population was described as healthy young males whose average age was 25, ranging from 18 to 43, all of whom were taking doxycycline orally on a daily basis as an antimalarial prophylactic measure. Inquiries were made into the nature and execution of assigned military tasks, nutritional intake, sleep history, and personal activities. After completing a questionnaire, we conducted a tilt test7 on the individual, the only diagnostic test available to us in our combat environment. We measured an individual’s orthostatic vitals (heart rate and blood pressure), separating supine and standing measurements by 3 minutes. Initial vitals were taken after the individual lay in the supine position for 5 minutes. Corspmen documented heart rates by taking the individual’s pulse radially for a period of 30 seconds and multiplying it by 2. Although a tilt test may be less accurate in measuring dehydration than measuring biochemical markers such as a blood urea nitrogenxreatinine ratio or serum sodium concentration,8·9 its noninvasive nature, ease with which it is administered, and familiarity to Navy medical personnel make it a useful tool to monitor an individuars hydration. The tilt test’s applicability as a screening test for hypovolemia in this case is further supported by the homogeneity of the population studied, healthy young males exposed to an identical environment whose only variation is a function of individual activity.
Lessons Learned from the Canadian Forces Physiotherapy Experience during the Peacekeeping Operations in Bosnia
The musculoskeletal injuries and solthers’ demographic profiles observed by physiotherapy (PT) officers during the Canathan Forces peacekeeping mission Op-Palladium in Bosnia between 2000 and 2004 were characterized. The number of PT visits (N = 4,167; range, 310-974) and gender distribution (N = 2,558 cases; male, 80.8%-91%; female, 9.0%-16.4%) varied between tours. On average, >30% of the entire Canathan Forces contingent required PT services. Lower limb injuries were the single leading reason for PT treatment (41.8%) followed by the spine (28.5%) and the upper limb (21.5%). The most commonly affected joints were the knee (17.2%) and ankle (16.1%), the shoulder (14.4%), and the lumbar spine (14.4%). The 26 to 35 age group and combat arms showed the highest incidence of musculoskeletal injuries.
Musculoskeletal (MSK) conditions are having a huge impact in terms of high incidence and high noneffective rate or days not available for duty, rate of personnel medically discharged from service, and health of service members and military/combat readiness.1″16 In the late 1990s, Canathan Forces (CF) physiotherapy (PT) services were providing in-garrison care to ~25% of the whole CF population. This percentage was found to be higher on high training bases, where tasks are similar to what we would expect during deployments.17 In 1999, although the CF were not yet deploying PT officers (PTOs) during peace-keeping missions, nonofficial CF statistics were suggesting that the incidence of MSK injuries would be equal to, if not higher, during operations as compared to in-garrison.
For many years, there was mounting pressure from solthers, commanding officers, and health care providers on the CF to provide PT services during deployments to ensure continuity of care and maintain operational readiness.18 In 2000, the CF finally decided to deploy PT services during the peacekeeping operations in Bosnia. The mandate of the CF physiotherapists was to provide the full spectrum of PT services to all CF members deployed anytime, anywhere for the Op-Palladium in Bosnia-Herzigovina starting with the Roto 6, and as long as deemed required. In that context, the aim of this descriptive study was to characterize the MSK injury profiles observed in PT during this CF peacekeeping mission in Bosnia. The secondary objective was to verify and quantify the existence and magnitude of MSK- related problems associated to this specific mission, and to learn from this deployment to better prepare PTOs for future CF missions. This latter information is essential to the CF PT chain of command to optimize the predeployment training of PTOs and CF PT scope of practice in an operational environment.
Methods
Data Collection
The data were collected using the CF PT Continuous Quality Improvement (CF PT CQI) database that serves as both a national surveillance and a standardization tool.19 A sample of convenience was used. All the cases seen by the PTOs during Roto 6 to Roto 13, inclusively, were entered in the study. The CF PT CQI database was used on a stand alone computer by trained PT staff to capture patient demographics and clinical data as well as the relevant information related to the delivery of PT services on a case-by-case and visit-by-visit basis. In addition to the patient demographics (gender, rank, age, environment, unit, and military occupation) and clinical data (body parts, MSK diagnosis, and cause of injury), other variables were considered to characterize the profile of MSK injuries such as the size of the Canathan contingent, the case priority (Fig. 1) and the number of PT treatments received per case. The data were compiled in an anonymous format to preserve CF members’ confidentiality.
Health Care Services and PT Environment
The health care services that were available included the basic spectrum of care offered to ensure the availability of a Role 3 Health Services Support. The Canathan health care providers only saw Canathans. The PTO was mainly based in Zgon, which was the busiest camp. Zgon was also centrally located in the Canathan area of responsibility (AOR) making a larger number of CF members more accessible with minimal time spent traveling. The other camps of Velika Kladusa, Corallici, Bihac, Drvar, Glamoc, and Tomislavgrad were visited on a weekly schedule, from Monday to Saturday inclusively, that slightly varied between tours. Glamoc was visited approximately one Saturday per month. Each solther referred for PT was put on a list before the physiotherapist’s visit. The camp at Tomislavgrad was closed at the beginning of the Roto 11, reducing the client base by ~250 personnel. The ethics committee of the CF Health Services approved this study protocol.
Data Analysis
All statistical analyses were done using SPSS version 1 1.0 for Windows (SPSS Inc., Chicago, Illinois). Descriptive statistics were used to summarize CF members’ characteristics, clinical data, and profiles of MSK injuries. For all demographic and clinical variables, t tests were conducted to verify statistical differences. The Pearson product moment correlation coefficient was used to verify whether there was a relationship between the tour duration in days, the contingent size, and the number of attendances in PT. All statistical analyses used an a level of 0.05.
During the Op-Palladium in Bosnia, the CF provided PT services from February 2000 (Roto 6) to March 2004 (Roto 13). Each PTO was deployed for a duration of ~190 days. Table I summarizes the number of initial PT assessments, follow-ups, total visits, the start and end date, and the mean number of treatments per case for each tour. Overall, a total of 2558 cases were seen for a total of 4,167 PT consultations. If we exclude Roto 8 for which we had missing data, the number of PT visits per tour varied from 414 to 1,077, and the mean number of follow-ups per case was 1.6 (Table I).
As reported in Table II, 85.8% of males and 13.7% of females were consulted for PT services with a mean age of 32.9 (SD, 7.2; range, 18-56). The mean percentage of solthers of the Canathan contingent seen in PT was 28.3% (range, 11.4%-42.8%). The percentages of MSK cases seen per age group, all rotations combined, were: 18% for ages 18 to 25, 46.7% for ages 26 to 35, 30. 1% for ages 36 to 45, and 5.2% for ages 46 years and older (Fig. 2).
As seen in Figure 3, there was no significant statistical relationship between the duration of the rotation (168-203 days), the number of attendances in PT (197-1077 visits), and the size of the Canathan contingent (1144-1732 solthers), which was similar for the first three rotations and slightly decreased to remain almost the same for the Rotos 10 to 13 (p > 0.05).
lower limb injuries were the single leading cause for PT treatment (41.8%) followed by the spine (28.5%) and the upper limb (21.5%). The most commonly affected joints were the knee (17.2%) and ankle (16.1%) in the lower limb category; the shoulder joint in the upper limb category (14.4%), and the lumbar spine (14.4%) in the spine category. The patients seen in PT were coming from a total of 1 13 different military occupations that were regrouped into 7 broader occupational subgroups. As seen in Figure 5, combat arms showed the highest incidence of MSK injuries, contributing to 46.1% of all injuries followed by 25.5% for the logistic and technical support group.
According to the CF PT priority system (Fig. 1) that was used to classify the stage of MSK injuries, 30. 1% of all injuries seen in PT were acute while 30. 1% and 38% were subacute and chronic, respectively.
Integrating armor into personnel recovery operations
The 507th Maintenance Company mistakenly entered the city of An Nasiriyah on the morning of 23 March 2003. Iraqi soldiers, al Quds militia, and Saddam Fedayeen fighters would ambush the lost unit, killing and wounding 21 soldiers and taking six prisoners. Over the next week, while Task Force Tarawa continued to fight a determined resistance, the U.S. Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps prepared to conduct what would be the first successful rescue of an American prisoner of war since World War II. Marine Corps M1A1 tankers contributed to this joint operation by bringing additional shock, awe, and firepower to an already impressive combined arms force. Operation Iraqi Freedom saw tanks exponentially prove their worth in the urban environment, and the role of armor would expand into personnel recovery (PR) operations.
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3270.01A defines personnel recovery (PR) as “… the recovery and return of U.S. Military, DOD civilians, and DOD contractor personnel who are isolated or missing while participating in a U.S. Government-sanctioned military activity or missions in an uncertain or hostile environment, or as determined by the Secretary of Defense.” (1) The Army’s PR philosophy is one of leadership and accountability and every command makes every effort to ultimately recover 100 percent of its personnel.
(2)In April 2003, during the battle for An Nasiriyah, Iraq, I commanded 3d Platoon, Alpha Company, 8th Tank Battalion, Task Force (TF) Tarawa, 2d Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB). This tank platoon, along with Marine artillery, aviation, force reconnaissance, and infantry, participated in a truly joint PR operation alongside special operations forces (SOF) from the U.S. Army, Air Force, and Navy. Operation Iraqi Freedom saw tanks exponentially prove their worth during urban operations and expand their role to include PR.
During Operation Desert Storm, Iraqi military commanders learned that in open land warfare they could not match the technological superiority of the United States military machine. If the Iraqi army wanted a different outcome in a future war, the fighting would have to be waged in the streets of Iraqi cities. If Saddam Hussein were to be removed from power, the U.S. military would have to move into Baghdad. Iraqi generals decided that the most logical defense along a southern approach would have to occur in Iraq’s fifth largest city and home of the 11th Infantry Division. An Nasiriyah would provide cover from U.S. air superiority, since Iraqi commanders seriously doubted that Americans would bomb 500,000 Iraqi citizens.
(3)The city of An Nasiriyah was heavily defended by an entire Iraqi army brigade along its southern portion bordering the Euphrates River. Another brigade dug in inside the city, and a third brigade was located north of the Saddam Canal. Technicals, armored personnel carriers (APCs), mortars, artillery, anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) guns, and tanks were spread throughout the city in well-planned and well-fortified positions. Arms and ammunition caches were located in strategic locations and included mosques, schools, and hospitals. Five hundred of Uday Hussein’s fanatical henchmen, the Saddam Fedayeen, were sent to the city to ensure the 11th Infantry Division and the local al Quds militia remained loyal and motivated.
Members of the Ba’ath party militia also had a great deal at stake in defending the city, since they controlled and lived a luxurious life at the expense of the local Shia population.
(4) In and around An Nasiriyah, the combined strength of regular and irregular forces was somewhere between 6,000 to 10,000 men. Iraqi commanders had planned a deliberate defense and were ready to draw approximately 2,000 U.S. forces into a deadly urban fight.
(5) Unfortunately, the first unit to face this defense was a logistics company from Fort Bliss, Texas.
(6) The 507th Maintenance Company was part of an impressive U.S. Army supply line, and its primary mission was to provide maintenance, supplies, and support to a patriot missile battery that would advance north toward Baghdad with the 3d Infantry Division. The 507th’s company commander entered the Army as a dental assistant and eventually worked his way into commanding mechanics, cooks, computer technicians, and clerks who lacked basic military fighting skills. He did not expect these support troops to see combat and even had his soldiers’ hand grenades and AT-4 antitank weapons collected and locked up prior to combat operations.
(7)The 507th departed Attack Position (AP) Dawson, just south of the Kuwait-Iraq border, at 0700 hours on 20 March. Due to the rough cross-country travel, the unit only moved 35 kilometers in 4 hours before stopping to rest. The next evening, they traveled 80 kilometers northwest across the barren desert and the convoy soon began to feel the effects of off-road travel in southern Iraq.
(8) Darkness, disorientation, soft sand, and flat tires mired the convoy causing it to drop farther behind from the rest of the logistics train.
On the evening of 22 March, as the 507th drew closer to An Nasiriyah, TF Tarawa, 2d MEB, from Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, was tasked to conduct a relief in place (RIP) with the 3d Brigade Combat Team (BCT) near Talill Air Base at 0430 hours on 23 March. The 3d BCT felt it was unnecessary to move north on Highway 7 and clear the southern end of An Nasiriyah, as had been planned. Instead, it proceeded along Highway 1 to the Euphrates River and turned left on to Highway 8 to continue its move toward the west.
The Army had not heard anything about a possible capitulation from the 11th Infantry Division and had no intention of going into the city to seize its eastern bridges. Marine commanders were worried about the condition of the Highway 1 Bridge located north of the Euphrates River, since it was a new highway with some portions still under construction. The 1st Marine Division had recently left the southern Al Luhays oilfields and was charging toward Baghdad on Highway 1. The commander of I Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) determined it was critical to develop a second avenue of approach, in the event Saddam Hussein ordered an attack on advancing Marines, and chose Route 7 as the second route.
(9) TF Tarawa was assigned as the main effort and ordered to seize the bridges along that route by 230700Z (1000 hours local time).
The 507th Maintenance Company was to proceed north along Highway 8, “Route Blue,” and turn left at the intersection with Highway 1, “Route Jackson,” avoiding An Nasiriyah altogether. A manned checkpoint had been put in place to direct stragglers to the detour, but by the time the 507th arrived, it had been abandoned. (10) At approximately 0600 hours, the 507th’s convoy crossed over a railroad and traveled past a company of dug-in Iraqi tanks, and an outlying industrial area composed of oil storage tanks, power lines, a gas station, and a garbage dump. At a significant intersection with clearly marked signs, Highway 8 went off to the west through the southern portion of the city toward the Highway 1 Bridge.
(11) The 507th missed that turn, drove straight through downtown An Nasiriyah, and was ambushed with a “torrent of fire.”
(12) Eleven members of the 507th would eventually perish as a result of combat actions that morning. Seven others would become Operation Iraqi Freedom’s first prisoners of war (POWs).
(13) The PR Operation
Within days, a concerned local Iraqi lawyer confirmed that an American POW was being held at the Saddam Hussein Hospital. After 2 days of gathering intelligence, he brought five different and very detailed maps that he and his wife had made. The illustrations pointed out the exact room of the captured soldier. The lawyer also provided the security layout, reaction plan, and times of shift changes. Through his surveillance, he had counted 41 Iraqi soldiers or insurgents at the hospital, with four in civilian clothes guarding the captured soldier’s room. He mentioned that they were armed with Kalaschnikov AK-47 assault rifles and carried radios. His reconnaissance further determined that the building’s rooftop could support a helicopter landing.
(14) After all the human intelligence had been received and authorization was granted from the highest military authorities, preparations for a personnel recovery operation were underway. The U.S. Army would take command of the rescue mission, turning TF Tarawa’s command post into a sophisticated reconnaissance operations center.
(15) A Marine 2d Force Reconnaissance team moved in from the west close enough to observe and listen to activity from the Hussein Hospital grounds, and reconnaissance snipers were positioned to prevent enemy forces from thwarting the rescue.
TF Tarawa began relentlessly attacking the enemy with overwhelming artillery and precision air strikes from AV-8B Harriers and Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) AC-130 Spectre gunship howitzer rounds.
(16) By early morning on 1 April, civilian communications equipment, to include satellite phones and computer connections, were blacked out.
(17) Shortly before midnight, electrical power was cut and only the hospital’s emergency generators provided light. Real-time images of the area were provided by a Predator unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) circling overhead, improving the situational awareness of the joint operations center.
(18) The battlefield had been prepared and the planning stages of the POW rescue operation were nearly complete. While air supremacy and overwhelming reconnaissance was achieved, heavy armored combat power was still lacking.
To fill this void, a tank platoon from Alpha Company, 8th Tank Battalion, was needed to escort a convoy of 18 vehicles carrying elite forces from the U.S. Army and Navy into the center of the city. Due to a shortage of readily available parts and continuous combat operations, the maintenance status of tracked vehicles in theater was less than desirable; however, with three tanks, Alpha Company’s 3d Platoon (Blue) was provided enormous combat power and shock effect.
As soon as the tank platoon received its warning order to conduct a POW mission, the tankers began preparing their vehicles. Marines immediately performed track maintenance and refueled their vehicles. Tow bars were already in place and ammunition was evenly cross-leveled, but nonessential items, such as rucksacks, meals ready to eat (MRE) boxes, and fuel cans were unloaded to avoid any accidental losses or fire hazards.
Special operations commanders coordinated with tank platoon commanders to seek advice on how to position vehicles to effectively block enemy avenues of approach from the center of the city. Satellite imagery aided the tank platoon in identifying possible individual vehicle positions and gave direction on where to place target reference points to properly control direct fire. Accurate imagery and thorough map rehearsals allowed all three tanks to share a common operating picture.
As soon as the Marine tank platoon was attached to the SOF unit, the tank commanders ensured they had positive communications with each other and the rest of the rescue team. Loading radio frequencies onto three tanks would take approximately 45 minutes, since the Army Ranger radio operators were unfamiliar with the Marine PRC119. Once radio checks were performed, the tankers were ready to lead the convoy.
Around 1130 hours on 1 April, a convoy of three M1A1s and four Pandar SOF vehicles, 12 M1114s, and two Marine seven-ton trucks carrying soldiers from the 75th Ranger Regiment, departed for the northwest Saddam Canal Bridge near the intersections of Highways 7 and 16. Alpha Company from 1st Battalion, 2d Marine Regiment, was ready to assist the main effort as a quick reaction force (QRF) to avoid a repeat of the Mogadishu disaster or the aborted rescue attempt in Tehran.
(19) At 1155 hours, Blue 4, assigned as the platoon’s plow tank for the operation, cleared a route near the Saddam Canal Bridge through cars that had been placed along the northwestern portion of Highway 7 earlier in the week to block enemy vehicles. As the plow tank pushed a disabled vehicle off the road, the remaining two tanks led the convoy across the Saddam Canal Bridge toward the Saddam Hussein Hospital, a distance of approximately 3 kilometers. The plow tank commander counted the vehicles as they passed by and quickly followed in trace to provide rear area security for the convoy.
(20) Near simultaneously in the southwest portion of the city, the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) conducted a diversionary attack, along with Charlie Battery, 1st Battalion, 10th Marines, on the headquarters of Saddam’s Ba’ath party. This massive eruption of firepower was used to deceive enemy fighters, causing them to think that an attack would occur along the western Euphrates Bridge, while the main effort maneuvered from the northwest. Marine and Air Force aircraft provided close air support (CAS) while UAVs circled above the hospital, providing real-time data back to the joint command center. Marine CH-46s ferrying a company of Army Rangers, Army CH-47s, and MH-6 Little Bird helicopters from the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment rushed to their target. After dropping their personnel, the Little Birds and Black Hawks stood ready to provide additional CAS and evacuate personnel.
Dehydration in Extreme Temperatures While Conducting Stability and Support Operations in a Combat Zone
This analysis reports the effects of extreme temperatures (temperatures exceeding 100°F) on the hydration of infantrymen conducting stability and support operations during phase IV Operation Iraqi Freedom in the months of June and July 2003 in An Nasiriyah, Iraq. Fifty-three infantrymen were evaluated for signs of dehydration after completing questionnaires regarding their activities during the previous 24 hours. We conducted an analysis comparing these activities and their state of hydration. The most significant factors contributing to dehydration in extreme environments proved to be the individual’s level of exertion and exposure to the sun while levels of water and caffeine consumed showed no correlation to one’s level of hydration. We conclude that integrating a proactive, field-expedient means to monitor a unit’s level of hydration can increase the combat effectiveness of units in training and combat alike.
An infantry company consisting of 158 Marines and Saflors in southern Iraq was conducting stabUity and support operations (SASO) during the summer months of 2003. Southern Iraq is a region exposed to extremely high daUy temperatures during the spring and summer months. During the months of June and July, the average temperatures in An Nasiriyah, Iraq, range from lows in the 90s to highs exceeding 1 1O°F as shown in Figure 1 . Temperatures during June and July of 2003 in An Nasiriyah were reported to exceed 12O°F and showed sirmlar averages from 90 to 110°F in June and 95 to 1 14°F in July.1
Dehydration can result in physical fatigue as well as cause significant decreases in performance of physical and mental skills.2-4 Dehydration of individual Sailors and Marines has a direct effect on the performance and military readiness of their unit in a combat environment. Extreme environments make hydration a critical factor in military planning and combat command. The basic guidance from our medical personnel directed Marines and Sailors to prevent dehydration by drinking as much water as possible and avoiding caffeine, summarized in Figure 2.
Extreme conditions push the body to its physiological Umlts.5 Combat operations in such environments further compound the difficulties of staying hydrated. To determine proper prophylactic measures to guard against dehydration in extreme temperatures, it is necessary to understand which mUitary tasks are most likely to result in the dehydration of infantrymen and how to mitigate their effects. Monitoring individual hydration can minimize dehydration,6 and monitoring hydration levels throughout a unit would improve its combat effectiveness.
Co. F 2/25 occupied three positions within the heart of An Nasiriyah, Iraq, among the local populace. The situation Umited the comfort living features, such as electricity and air conditioning, afforded to the company’s Marines and Sailors. Furthermore, SASO required 24-hour operations throughout our area of operation. At least one patrol through every portion of our area of operation was conducted each 8 hours, totaling -600 patrols over 85 days.
Our company’s presence in An Nasiriyah provided a unique opportunity to evaluate the effects of combat operations and SASO on dehydration of infantrymen as weU as the guidance we received regarding hydration. As far as we are aware, the majority of references on this topic detail studies on units in training scenarios or are case studies of combat experiences in hot environments; whereas, this is an analysis of data coUected on dehydration in a theater of continuing combat. We beUeve this makes our analysis new and useful to current and future units deploying to the Iraqi theater or other environments exposed to extreme temperatures. We conducted this analysis during the opportunities our mission requirements aUowed and beUeve that our findings are appUcable to combat arms and combat support units alike.
Methods
Co. F 2/25 simultaneously occupied three positions within An Nasiriyah during this period. One hundred of the 158 Marines and Sailors of the company were in the company headquarter position where the authors were. The other two company positions, each consisting of a platoon, were occupied by the other 58 Marines and Sailors. The data collected were solely from the company headquarter position, consisting of a rifle platoon, weapons platoon, and company headquarters personnel. Measurements from additional positions exceeded mission constraints.
Members of the company were exposed to the local climate for 3 months before the time measurements were taken in June and July 2003; therefore, we assumed all members of the company were accUmated to the extreme temperatures. The company position was a multistoried, war-torn, government buüding. Sleeping, eating, and working areas within the position were exposed to the ambient atmosphere. The single air conditioner used within the position was used to cool water and food, for which ice had previously been used. None of the vehicles used by the company were air-conditioned.
The command originally used routine measuring of vital signs as a means of monitoring hydration before any collection of ‘data. Upon realizing the surprising number of “walking dehydration” cases, the authors proposed that further information be gathered from members of the company headquarters position to determine causative factors of dehydration. Realizing that information was to be gathered, analyzed, and potentially reported, data were recorded only from those that provided informed consent after being briefed on the goals, benefits, and risks of such an analysis.
Soluble film holds problem’s solution: packaging unit doses of water-treatment chemicals in water-soluble film ensures safety and accuracy
The powerful chemicals used to treat industrial water can be a little hard to handle.
But by using a special film, Buckman Laboratories and its contract packager made their problems dissolve.
Buckman Laboratories, a manufacturer of specialty chemical compounds, is using water-soluble film from MonoSol LLC for pre-measured unit doses of its water treatment chemicals. These chemicals inhibit the growth of microorganisms that could cause fouling problems in industrial heating and cooling systems. MonoSol’s M9500 film addresses the dual challenges of environmental safety and container management. Packaging these chemicals in water-soluble pouches minimizes risks for product handlers, reduces pollution and eliminates product spillage, while assuring mixing accuracy.
“In solid form, the water treatment chemicals can be easily mixed and packaged in a much safer-to-handle package,” says Rick Clark, technology director for water treatment at Buckman Laboratories. “The total concept–formulation and packaging–is to limit human contact with the chemical and also to eliminate the need to dispose of waste packaging.”
Buckman uses contract packer Bartlo Packaging Services (BPS) to package the water-treatment chemical. “We’ve been using water-soluble film in our New Jersey facility since there was water-soluble film,” says BPS President Al Bartlo. “Packaging in unit doses is where the agrochemical and cleaning-products industries are headed.”
Material is shipped in drums or bulk delivery systems for BPS to repackage into unit doses for industrial and commercial use. BPS handles liquid, powdered and gel chemicals on its 13 packaging lines, packaging a variety of chemicals from active detergents to toxic insecticides.
Films for BPS customers are specified by MonoSol’s state-of-the-art testing laboratory in Portage, Ind. Laboratory technicians perform tests to determine the long-term chemical and physical compatibility of a water-soluble film.
MonoSol’s M9500 water-soluble film was selected for Buckman’s water treatment chemicals. The M9500 produces mechanically tough packages with excellent heat-sealing characteristics, better seal area integrity and faster solubility at the point of use. Other improvements designed into the M9500 film are improved resistance to embrittlement and excellent cold storage capabilities.
The M9500 film offers a range of packaging possibilities, increasing the number of products that can be packaged in PVA water-soluble films. With enhanced machinability, the M9500 widens the scope of packaging equipment choices to include all types of vertical-form-fill-seal machinery. Appropriate for packaging neutral, mildly alkaline and acidic formulations, the M9500 is suitable for many powder, gel and liquid forms of chemicals and detergents as well as other products.